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EVIDENCE-THE SOCIAL WORKER-CLIENT PRIVILEGE-COmmOn

wealth v. Collell, 387 Mass. 424, 439 N.E.2d 1223 (1982).
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1977, Massachusetts enacted a social worker-client privilege
statute I which contained provisions similar to statutes recently en
acted in nineteen other jurisdictions.2 In Commonwealth v. Collell,3
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court rendered the first appel
late interpretation of the statute.
The defendant, in Collell, had been indicted for murder in the
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 135 (West 1983), provides:
No social worker in any licensed category, including tho~e in private prac
tice, may disclose any information he may have acquired from persons consult
ing him in his professional capacity except:
(a) with the written consent of the person or, in the case of death or disability of
his own personal representative, other person authorized to sue, or the benefici
ary of an insurance policy on his life, health, or physical condition;
(b) that a licensed certified social worker, including those engaged in independ
ent clinical practice, licensed social worker, or licensed social work associate
shall not be required to treat as confidential a communication that reveals the
contemplation or commission of a crime or a harmful act;
(c) when the person waives the privilege by bringing charges against the li
censed certified social worker, including those engaged in independent clinical
practice, the licensed social worker, or the licensed social work associate;
(d) to initiate a proceeding under subsection C of section twenty-three of chap
ter one hundred and nineteen or section twenty-four of chapter one hundred
and nineteen or section three of chapter two hundred and ten and give testi
mony in connection therewith;
(e) In any other child custody case in which, upon a hearing in chambers, the
judge, in the exercise of his discretion, determines that the social worker has
evidence bearing significantly on the person's ability to provide suitable cus
tody, and that it is more important to the welfare of the child that the informa
tion be disclosed than that the relationship between the person and social
worker be protected.
2. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 71-2815 (Supp. 1983); CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 101O-1Ol2 (West
Supp. 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-63.5-115 (1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 3913
(Supp. 1982); IDAHO CODE § 54-3213 (1979); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. III, § 6324 (Supp.
1983-84); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-5360 (1977); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 335.170 (Bobbs
Merrill 1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:2714(B) (West 1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
32, § 7005 (Supp. 1983); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 339.1610 (Supp. 1982); N.M. STAT.
EVID. 509 (1983); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 4508 (McKinney Supp. 1982-83); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 59, § 1272.1 (West Supp. 1983-84); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.250 (1981); S.D. CODI
FIED LAWS ANN. § 36-26-30 (1977); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-35-10 (1974); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 7101 (Supp. 1983); VA. CODE § 8.01-400.2 (Supp. 1983).
3. 387 Mass. 424, 439 N.E.2d 1223 (1982).
I.
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second degree of his girl friend's seven-month-old child. 4 A social
worker, employed by the hospital where the injured child had been
admitted, interviewed the defendant and others with regard to the
cause of the child's injuries prior to the child's death.5 At a pretrial
hearing the social worker, claiming a privilege 6 under chapter 112,
section 135 of the Massachusetts General Laws, refused to disclose
fully, the information acquired from these interviews. 7 The supreme
judicial court granted the social worker's application for direct ap
pellate review of both the scope of the social worker-client privilege
and the scope of the exception to the privilege concerning "state
ments revealing the commission of a crime or harmful act."8
4. Id at 425, 439 N.E.2d at 1224.
5. Id at 426, 439 N.E.2d at 1225. The social worker was assigned to treat the
victim's family, which in cases of abuse would involve investigation into the cause of the
child's injuries and would include interviews with family members, friends and others.
The inclusion of social services by hospitals is seen as a necessary complement to total
health care and in cases of child abuse and neglect provides early intervention for assess
ment, treatment or referral according to the needs of the family. Gershenson, Child Mal
treatment and the Federal Role, in CHILD ABUSE AND VIOLENCE 18,32-35 (D. Gil ed.
1979); see also C. KEMPE & R. HELFER, THE BATTERED CHILD 280-85 (3d ed. 1980)
[hereinafter cited as THE BATTERED CHILD, 3d ed.).
6. 387 Mass. at 426, 439 N.E..2d at 1224. Although the privilege was asserted in
Collett by the social worker, the protection is extended for the benefit of the social
worker's clients and they are the actual owners of the privilege. The statutory grants of
privilege for certain relationships that are valued by society require that the professional
(social worker, physician, psychologist, or attorney) assert the privilege on behalf of the
patient or client unless the privilege is waived by the owner, or is abrogated by an excep
tion. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 72-73, at 152-53 (E.
Cleary ed. 1972).
7. 387 Mass. at 426, 439 N.E.2d at 1225.
8. Id at 425, 439 N.E.2d at 1225. The supreme judicial court, although not re
quested to do so by the lower court, also reviewed the procedure to be followed by a
judge to determine whether the sought after information falls within the scope of the
exception to the privilege. Id at 436, 439 N.E.2d at 1230. The court concluded that the
in camera hearing was the appropriate procedure to determine which communications
should be protected by the privilege but disapproved of the lower court's suggested inclu
sion of the prosecutor and defense attorney at the hearing. Id at 438, 439 N.E.2d at
1231. Although under common law the disclosure of information in the presence of a
third party suggested that the communication was not intended to be confidential and no
privilege would attach, MCCORMICK, supra note 6, §§ 91, 101, the use of the in camera
hearing has become an an established procedure to evaluate the intended scope of all
privileges. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 714-15 (1974) (district court judge was
directed to isolate relevant and admissible evidence and return other privileged Presiden
tial materials); Blaisdell v. Commonwealth, 372 Mass. 753, 768-69, 364 N.E.2d 191,201
02 (1977)(judicial procedure to evaluate privileged nature of statements made during a
court ordered psychiatric examination). The disclosure of secrets to a judge in camera
has not been challenged as a threat to confidential relationships, but rather, has been
justified as benefiting the judicial process by promoting confidence that a privilege has
not been abused. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 207 (1978).
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The Massachusetts court's decision in Col/ell broadly construed
the language of the statute with the result, as stated by the dissent,
that "virtually all communications with social workers which occur
during their performance of their duties must be found privileged
... unless these communications fall within the exceptions."9 In
addition, the court's interpretation of the exception to the privilege
regarding criminal acts was narrowly construed and limited required
disclosures to only those communications which "relate directly to
the fact or immediate circumstances of a crime."10 This decision,
therefore, offers the maximum protection for communications
originating within the social worker-client relationship. The possi
bility that this broad interpretation may provide a shield for perpe
trators of crimes or harmful acts warrants inquiry into the
fundamental bases \>f privileged communications.
This note, in addition to analyzing the court's decision in Col
lell, will review the drgins of the social worker-client privilege and
the appellate decisions interpreting statutory provisions in several ju
risdictions. A major focus of the note will be an application of the
conditions fundamental to the establishment of any privilege. I I The
note will conclude that although the analysis proposed is not man
dated by precedent in Massachusetts, it is one that has been recog
nized by numerous courts and commentators and, in the absence of
clear evidence oflegislative intent, offers a reasonable alternative an
alytical framework. Although the protection of privilege did not im
pede the prosecution in Col/ell,12 the precedent set by this case may
provide an unjustifiable shield of protection for perpetrators of
crimes against children. 13

II.

F ACTS

OF COLLEIT

On July 9, 1981, a seven-month-old child was admitted to the
Massachusetts General Hospital unconscious, with multiple black
and blue marks above the right temple. 14 The child never regained
consciousness and died one week later. 15 . The autopsy report indi
9. 387 Mass. at 441, 439 N.E.2d 1233 (Lynch, J., dissenting).
10. Id at 435, 439 N.E.2d at 1230.
II. See infra notes 125-183 and accompanying text.
12. Upon remand to the Suffolk Superior Court, the defendant was convicted of
second degree murder. Commonwealth v. Collett, No. 036178 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 10,
1982).
13. See infra notes 86-96 and accompanying text.
14. Commonwealth's Brief on Report from the Superior Court Department of the
Trial Court at 3-4, Commonwealth v. Collett, 387 Mass. 424, 439 N.E.2d 1223 (1982).
IS. Commonwealth's Brief, supra note 14, at 4.
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cated that "there were several bruises estimated to be about one
week old around the head. The cause of death was cerebral edema
and a subdural hematoma inflicted by blunt force to the head."16
During the week of the child's admission, a licensed social
worker employed by the hospital was assigned to treat the child's
familyP The social worker, as required by the child abuse and ne
glect mandated reporting statute,18 notified the Department of Social
Services that the injuries sustained by the child were consistent with
abuse. 19 Prior to the child's death, the social worker interviewed the
child's mother, other relatives, and the defendant. 20
As required by statute,21 the child's death resulting from the in
juries allegedly inflicted by the defendant, was reported to the medi
cal examiner and the district attorney. The social worker, when
called upon to testify before the Suffolk County Grand Jury, dis
closed that "during an interview with the defendant, he admitted to
her that he hit the victim on the night she was hospitalized and had
also hit her in the past."22 The social worker, claiming a privilege
under chapter 112, section 135 of the Massachusetts General Laws,23
refused to disclose additional communications "that concerned[ed]
the child's appearance and behavior prior to her hospitalization and
the feelings, observations, suspicions and hopes [that the defendant
and the child's relatives held] about the child and one another."24 In
16. Id. A subdural hematoma in infants is a serious life threatening head injury
which has recently been shown to occur almost exclusively as a result of intentional in
fliction by parents or caretakers. Helfer, Slovis, & Black, Injuries Resulting When Small
Children Fall Out of Bed, 60 PEDIATRICS 533-35 (1977).
17. Commonwealth v. Collett, 387 Mass. 424, 426,439 N.E.2d 1233, 1225 (1982).
18. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 51A (West Supp. 1983)(requires physicians,
nurses and other medical personnel, educators, counselors, probation officers, social
workers, foster parents and police who have cause to believe that a child has been abused
or neglected to report the information to the Department of Social Services and failure to
make the required report is punishable by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars).
19. Commonwealth v. Collett, 387 Mass. 424, 426, 439 N.E.2d 1223, 1225 (1982).
See supra note 16.
20. Collett, 387 Mass. at 426, 439 N.E.2d at 1225.
21. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 51A (West Supp. 1983). The statue, in addi
tion to the mandated reporting requirements, supra note 18, requires that any death that
may be attributed to child abuse or neglect must be reported to the district attorney as
well as to the Department of Social Services. This reporting mandate was recently ex
panded in Massachusetts to require that all serious injuries and incidents of sexual abuse
also must be reported to the district attorney. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 51B
(West Supp. 1983), amended by MASS. GEN. LAWS, S. Doc. No. 2064 (Aug. 13, 1983).
See infra note 88.
22. Commonwealth v. Collett, 387 Mass. 424, 426, 439 N.E.2d 1223, 1225 (1982).
23. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 135 (West Supp. 1983-84).
24. Commonwealth v. Collett, 387 Mass. 424, 426, 439 N.E.2d 1223, 1225 (1982).
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addition, the social worker refused to reveal "statements made [to
the social worker] by the defendant allegedly denying any wrongdo
ing."25 The defendant was indicted by the grand jury for second
degree murder. 26
At a pretrial hearing, the superior court judge ordered the social
worker to disclose "all of the alleged communications"27 at an in
camera hearing. 28 The social worker refused to comply with the or
der and requested and was granted direct appellate review. 29
In Collett, the supreme judicial court was requested to define to
whom the social worker-client privilege extends as well as the scope
of the exception to the privilege with regard to the commission of a
crime or harmful act. 30 The majority in Collett, relying on the broad
purpose of the legislation and the legislative history of the bill,31 as
well as a limited comparison with the statutes and opinions in other
jurisdictions,32 held, inter alia, that the social worker's privilege
under the statute,33 includes communications from all persons con
sulting the social worker in his or her professional capacity, regard
less of whether such persons are clients of the social worker. 34 In
addition, the court concluded that the exception to the privilege for
communications revealing the contemplation of a crime or harmful
act was to be narrowly construed and did not require disclosure of
all relevant information, but would be limited to only those commu
nications which relate directly to the commission or immediate cir
25. Id.
26. Id. at 435, 439 N.E.2d at 1224.
27. Id.
28. Id. See supra note 8.
29. Collett, 387 Mass. at 425, 439 N.E.2d at 1225; see supra note 8.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 429, 439 N.E.2d at 1227. The supreme judicial court compared the lan
guage of the enacted version of the social worker-client privilege statute, Massachusetts
General Laws ch. 112, section 135, see supra note I for text of the statute, with two earlier
versions of the statute, MASS. LEGIS. DOCUMENTS, H. 4877 (1971) and H. 1997 (1972),
which were not passed by the legislature. The court's analysis of these provisions is
presented later in this note. See infra notes 81-83, 101-06 and accompanying text. Each
year from 1971 to 1977, the legislature has considered bills for the licensing of social
workers, all of which contained a provision protecting confidential communications be
tween social workers and their clients. See MASS. LEGIs. DOCUMENTS, H. 5351 (1973),
H. 1306 (1974), H. 2917 (1975), H. 872 (1976), H. 4884 (1976). H. 2383 (1977). S. 463
(1977). S. 1693 (1977). These bills were not considered by the supreme judicial court in
Collett possibly because of their similarity to either the 1971 and 1972 bills or to the
enacted bill. For this reason. these provisions will not be discussed in this note.
32. Commonwealth v. Collett. 387 Mass. 424. 439-30. 439 N.E.2d 1223. 1227
(1982).
33. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112. § 135 (West 1983).
34. Collett, 387 Mass. at 430, 439 N.E.2d at 1227.
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cumstances of a crime or harmful act. 35
III.

BACKGROUND

The foundation of adjudication of civil and criminal disputes
rests upon the requirement that the most reliable sources of informa
tion be presented to the triers of fact and law. 36 The availability of
all reliable relevant testimonial evidence is guaranteed to litigants by
our system of justice which considers every person to be under a
duty to appear to testify upon proper subpoena, and to reveal
whatever he or she knows upon questioning as to the truth of the
subject of inquiry.37 A number of doctrines have evolved under
common law, however, which render certain types of evidence inad
missible because they are unreliable,38 irrelevant,39 or protected from
disclosure by a grant of privilege. 40 While the exclusion of unrelia
ble or irrelevant evidence promotes the determination of the facts,
the rules of privilege serve to obstruct the path to truth.41
A common law or statutory grant of a testimonial privilege from
forced disclosure of information which would otherwise be admissi
ble, insures that the holder of a privilege may invoke its protection
and refuse to answer questions in court without the risk of judicial
sanctions or contempt proceedings.42 As noted by Dean McCor
mick, testimonial privileges are condoned by our system of justice
because they serve to protect special interests and relationships
which "are regarded as of sufficient social importance to justify some
incidental sacrifice of sources of facts needed in the administration
of justice."43 Thus, in a system of justice which guarantees all liti
gants a fair trial and promotes the ascertainment of the truth,44 any
35. Id at 435, 439 N.E.2d at 1230.
36. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, at 20.
37. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932); Blair v. United States, 250
U.S. 273, 281-82 (1919).
38. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 10, at 20-22 (Testimonial evidence offered as
proof under common law must be based on first hand knowledge or may be inadmissible
under the hearsay or opinion rules.).
39. Id at 433-41 (evidence which is not applicable or supportive of the fact or issue
to be proved).
40. See infta notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
41. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, at 151-52.
42. See id at 151-60. See also R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 588-602
(3d ed. 1982); 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2194a (McNaughton rev. 1961).
43. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, at 152.
44. The rights to counsel, a speedy and public trial by jury, an opportunity to con
front witnesses and compulsory process to obtain favorable witnesses are guaranteed to
litigants by the sixth amendment. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 568.
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grant of privilege must be carefully scrutinized for it will impede the
determination of the facts_ 45
The concept of privilege originated at common law in the six
teenth century but was granted only to the attorney-client relation
ship.46 Today, testimonial privileges are created primarily by statute
and extend to a number of relationships including husband-wife,
clergy-penitent, physician-patient, psychologist-patient, accountant
client, journalist-informant, and social worker-client. 47 The grant of
a privilege is a legislative or judicial recognition that in some circum
stances the judicial policy of seeking full disclosure must yield to
competing policy concerns which favor confidentiality.48 Testimo
nial privileges are not absolute, however, and, although the scope of
applicability of any privilege varies widely from one jurisdiction to
the next, all statutory privileges reflect a legislative balancing of
competing policy concerns and deny the protection of privilege in
the presence of an overriding state interest.49
IV.

ANALYSIS: THE SOCIAL WORKER-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

In Collett ,50 the supreme judicial court interpreted the provi
sions of the recently enacted social worker-client privilege statute.
The broadly-worded statute required the court to look beyond the
language of the statute to ascertain the intent of the legislature. 51 In
the absence of recorded legislative history, however, the legislative
intent ascribed by a court to a promulgated law is, at best, an opin
ion as to the most probable of several possible interpretations. 52 The
court in Collett based its interpretation on the presumed purpose of
45. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974)("Whatever their origins, these
exceptions to the demand for every man's evidence are not lightly created nor expan
sively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth."). See also WIGMORE,
supra note 42, § 2192, at 73.
46. WIGMORE, supra note 42, § 2290, at 542-45.
47. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, at 156-60. McCormick notes some exceptions to
the general rule for the statutory creation of privileges. Id at 156 n. 32. See also Allred
v. State, 554 P.2d 411 (Alaska 1976)(common law recognition of psychotherapist testimo
nial privilege).
48. See WIGMORE, supra note 42, at §§ 2196, 2285, 2286; MCCORMIcK,supra note
6, at 151-52.
49. Collell, 387 Mass. at 428, 439 N.E.2d at 1226; see generally MCCORMICK, supra
note 6, at 156-60.
50. 387 Mass. 424, 439 N.E.2d 1223 (1982).
51. See generally MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 4, § 6 (Michie/Law. Coop. 1980)(rules for
construing statutes).
.
52. See Dickerson, Statutory Interpretation: A Peek into the Mind and Will of a
Legislature, 50 IND. L. REV. 206 (1975).
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the enactment,53 the legislative history of the bill,54 and a considera
tion of similar provisions as interpreted by courts in other jurisdic
tions. 55 Although there are few appellate opinions interpreting
social worker-client privilege statutes, a comparison of similarities
and distinctions among several jurisdictions reveals some of the al
ternative interpretations available to the court in Collett.
A.

Scope of the privilege

In most jurisdictions, the language defining the scope of the so
cial worker-client privilege is worded broadly, implying that all com
munications originating within the context of the protected
relationship must be held in confidence. Although the language uti
lized varies widely from one jurisdiction to the next, most statutes
forbid the disclosure of information acquired frompersons consulting
the social worker in his professional capacity, 56 or in some instances
limit the application of the privilege to a client relationship.57 A few
jurisdictions have a more specific limitation, however, and require
that the communications originate within a therapeutic setting.58
New Mexico's provision is unique in that it extends the privilege
only to those relationships arising pursuant to an allegation that a
child is delinquent or in need of supervision.59 Under the New Mex
ico provision, only the child, parent, guardian or custodian may
claim the privilege. 60 Statutes containing highly specific language,
such as those requiring a therapeutic relationship,61 clearly define the
intent of the legislature and, therefore, limit judicial discretion in
cases requiring interpretation of such provisions. 62 The intent of the
legislature is much less clear, however, in statutory provisions which
53. 387 Mass. at 427, 439 N.E.2d at 1226; see infra text accompanying note Ill.
54. 387 Mass. at 429-30, 439 N.E.2d at 1227; see infra notes 82-83, 102-107 and
accompanying text.
55. 387 Mass. at 429-31,439 N.E.2d at 1227-28.
56. Eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 3913 (Supp. 1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-5360
(1977); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. ll2, § 135 (West 1983).
57. Eg., MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 339.1610 (West Supp. 1983-84); N.Y. CIV.
PRAC. LAW § 4508 (McKinney Supp. 1982-83); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.250 (1981).
58. Eg., CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1010-1012 (West Supp. 1983); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 335.170 (Bobbs-Merrill 1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:2714B (West 1974).
59. N.M. R. EVID. 509.
60. Id.
61. See supra note 58.
62. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 4, § 6 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1980); Corcoran V. S.S.
Kresge Co., 313 Mass. 299, 303, 47 N.E.2d 257, 259 (1943) ("if the words of the statute
are clear and explicit, there is no room for speculation").
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extend the privilege to persons consulting the social worker in his pro
fessional capacity or to the social worker's client.
At least two courts have addressed ambiguous language in the
portion of the social worker-client statute which defines the applica
ble scope of the privilege. 63 In People v. Lipsky,64 the defendant had
disclosed to a social worker information concerning his involvement
in a homicide. The New York court, in order to determine whether
the privilege was applicable, was required to interpret the statute
which provided, in pertinent part, that a "social worker. . . shall not
be required to disclose a communication made by his client to
him. . . ."65 The court concluded, inter alia, that although the so
cial worker had interviewed the defendant under a court-ordered
evaluation prior to sentencing for an offense in another jurisdiction,
there was "no indication that the defendant was the client of [the
social worker]."66 The court reasoned that "[t]he mere circum
stances [sic] that [the social worker] ... was interviewing the de
fendant [did] not in and of itself establish a client relationship. The
defendant made disclosures during the initial interview. There was
no advice given or program planned."67 Thus, the New York court
seemed to indicate that not all disclosures made to a social worker
would fall within the scope of the privilege, but inferred that perhaps
a counseling or therapeutic requirement was necessary to justify ex
tension of the privilege.
The Supreme Court of South Dakota demonstrated a similar
inclination to limit the applicable scope of the social worker privi
lege. In State v. Martin ,68 the court reviewed a statutory provision
which stated, in pertinent part, that "[n]o ... social worker . . .
may disclose any information he may have acquired from persons
consulting him in his professional capacity that was necessary to en
able him to render services in his professional capacity to those per
sons. . . ."69 The court concluded, inter alia, that this language
63. People v. Lipsky, 102 Misc. 2d 19, 423 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1979); State v. Martin,
274 N.W.2d 893 (S.D. 1979), cerl. denied, 444 U.S. 883 (1979).
64. 102 Misc. 2d 19,423 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1979).
65. N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 4508 (McKinney Supp. 1982-83)(emphasis supplied).
66. Lipsky, 102 Misc. 2d at 24, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 602 (emphasis supplied).
67. Id. The court in addition noted that the social worker did not meet the licens
ing requirements under New York's education law, N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 7704 (McKinney
1972 & Supp. 1982-83), nor did the defendant have any explicit assurance of confidenti
ality from the social worker. Lipsky, 102 Misc. 2d at 24, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 602-03. An
implicit or explicit assurance of confidentiality is considered an essential element to jus
tify the extension of a privilege. See infra notes 131-51 and accompanying text.
68. 274 N.W.2d 893 (S.D. 1979).
69. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 36-26-30 (19J7)(emphasis supplied).
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indicated a legislative intent "to require inquiry into the facts and
circumstances in each case,"70 and although the social worker had
treated the defendant for a period of six to eight months, the defend
ant's conversations disclosing the commission of a crime did not fall
within the scope of the privilege. 71 The court in Martin noted that
there were fundamental conditions that must be met to justify the
extension of a privilege. The court reasoned that because the de
fendant had no assurance or expectation of confidentiality, there was
no basis for the extension of the protection. 72 In addition, the court
noted that "the conversations offered in this case did not relate to
anything material to and did not arise out of their specific relation
ship."73 Thus, even though the social worker and the defendant had
established a relationship which would appear to be within the scope
of the privilege, the South Dakota court was not willing to give the
statute such a broad interpretation.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court faced comparably
ambiguous statutory language in Commonwealth v. Collett. 74 The
court was requested to interpret the scope of the social worker-client
privilege statute which provided, in pertinent part, that "[n]o social
worker . . . may disclose any information he may have acquired
from persons consulting him in his professional capacity."75 The
court rejected the Commonwealth's suggestion that the statute
should apply only "when a professional relationship exists between a
social worker and a client,"76 and reasoned that in a case of sus
pected child abuse a social worker, in the course of rendering serv
ices, would be expected to communicate "with members of the
70. Martin, 274 N.W.2d at 895.
71. Id at 896.
72. Id The court in Lipsky also recognized that an assurance or expectation of
confidentiality was basic to the establishment of a privilege. The New York court noted
that the defendant had been informed that "there would be no confidentiality if the mat
ter [he voluntarily disclosed] involved a capital offense." People v. Lipsky, 102 Misc. 2d
19, 24, 423 N.Y.S.2d 599, 601 (1979).
73. State v. Martin, 274 N.W.2d 893, 896 (S.D. 1979). The appellant in Marlin
argued that his admission to his psychiatric social worker in a telephone conversation
that he had killed someone was privileged under South Dakota law. Id at 895 (citing
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 36-26-30 (1977». The state argued that because one of the
social worker's concerns subsequent to the conversation was that the defendant might
commit suicide, the conversation was not privileged because it fell within the scope of the
exception for communications revealing the contemplation of "a harmful act". The
court, however, found it unnecessary to rule on this issue. Id
74. 387 Mass. 424, 439 N.E.2d 1223 (1982).
75. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 135 (West 1983), see supra note I for full
text of the statute.
76. Commonwealth v. Collett, 387 Mass. 424, 428, 439 N.E.2d 1223, 1226 (1982).
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victim's family and others closely connected to the victim's home
situation."77 The court concluded that because the social worker
had spoken with the defendant and members of the victim's family
during the course of her professional employment, these individuals
would be entitled to claim the privilege. 78 The supreme judicial court
acknowledged the narrow interpretation given to the scope of the
privilege by the courts in Lipsky79 and Martin,80 but distinguished
the instant case because the Massachusetts statute did not contain
language restricting the scope of the privilege to the social worker's
client. 81 The majority opinion in Collett noted that a client qualifica
tion was contained in earlier versions of the statute which had not
been enacted,82 but since this limitation was not included in the en
acted version, the court concluded it was therefore not necessary to
make this distinction in determining the scope of the privilege. 83
The majority opinion offered no additional support for this conclu
sion. Justice Lynch, in dissent, however, maintained that the court's
conclusion was overly broad in that it extended the protection to all
communications with social workers regardless of "whether third
parties [were] present, or assurances of confidentiality [had] been
made,84 unless these communications [fell] within the [exceptions to
77. Id. at 429, 439 N.E.2d at 1227.
78. Id.
79. 102 Misc. 2d 19,423 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1979); see supra notes 64-67 and accompa
nying text.
80. 274 N.W.2d 893 (S.D. 1979). cerl. denied, 444 U.S. 883 (1979), see supra notes
68-73 and accompanying text.
8!. Commonwealth v. Collett, 387 Mass. 424, 429-30, 439 N.E.2d 1223, 1227
(1982).
82. Id. at 430, 439 N.E.2d at 1227. Earlier versions of the statute provided, in
pertinent part, that: "No. . . social worker. . . may disclose any information he may
have acquired from persons consulting him in his professional capacity Ihal was necessary
10 enable him 10 render services in his professional capacity 10 Ihose persons." MASS.
LEGIS. DOCUMENTS, H. 4877 (1971) and H. 1997 (1972)(emphasis supplied). Statutory
language which restricts the scope of the social worker-client privilege, similar to the
earlier versions of the Massachusetts statute, has been adopted in several jurisdictions.
E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. Ill, § 6324 (Supp. 1983-84); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32,
§ 7005 (Supp. 1983).
83. 387 Mass. at 430, 439 N.E.2d at 1227.
84. Justice Lynch offered this criticism of the majority opinion based on the com
mon law requirement of confidentiality as a prerequisite to a claim of privilege. If disclo
sures are made in the presence of a casual third person, under common law, they will not
be considered confidential, and thus, no privilege will attach. If the third person is "pres
ent as a needed and customary participant in the consultation," however, the "circle of
confidence" will be widened to include that person, and the privilege will be preserved.
MCCORMICK supra note 6, at 216. McCormick notes that close family members or a
physician's assistant would be examples of third persons who would not violate the confi
dentiality requirement. Id. at 216-17. The social work profession has suggested that this
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the privilege]."85
The broad interpretation of the scope of the privilege by the
majority in Collett has potentially far reaching implications for fu
ture cases of child abuse and neglect. Like many other states, Mas
sachusetts has historically favored a policy of rehabilitation 86 rather
than prosecution of perpetrators of child abuse and neglect. This
policy is based on the theory that criminal prosecution may not only
reinforce the psychological traits which were responsible for the
harmful conduct, but also may serve to destroy the integrity of the
family and thereby cause additional injury to the child. 87 But in
cases of serious injury or death this rationale collapses and prosecu
tion is warranted. 88
"circle of confidence" extends not only to all participants in "group therapy," but in some
instances to a whole network of "significant persons" who make up what is referred to as
a "client system." Iaccarino, Privileged Communications in Social Work, SOCIAL
CASEWORK 367, 370 (1980). See infra notes 136-43 and accompanying text.
85. 387 Mass. 424, 441, 439 N.E.2d 1223, 1233 (Lynch, J., dissenting).
86. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § I (West Supp. 1983-84), which provides
in pertinent part: "It is hereby declared to be the policy of this commonwealth to direct
its efforts, first, to the strengthening and encouragement of family life for the protection
and care of children; [and] to assist and encourage the use by any family of all available
resources to this end . . ." See also People v. Abrams, 73 Misc. 2d 534, 536, 341
N.Y.S.2d 515, 518 (1973) (Interpreting the New York Family Court Act, the court stated,
"offenses arising from family conflict·should be weighed initially by the family court with
the view of counseling and preserving the family unit.").
87. Grumet, The Plaintive Plaint(jft: Victims of the Ballered Child Syndrome, 4
FAM. L.Q. 296, 307-313 (1970)(prosecution is undesirable and ineffective because it infre
quently results in conviction, increases hostility toward the child and therefore, repeated
abuse, and in addition is likely to cause parents to resist treatment); see also Steele &
Pollock, A Psychiatric Study of Parents Who Abuse Infants and Small Children in R.
HELFER & C. KEMPE, THE BATTERED CHILD 124-31 (2d ed. 1974)(reporting the effec
tiveness of psychotherapy for rehabilitation of abusive parents); J. GOLDSTEIN, A.
FREUD, & A. SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 24-25 (1979)[herein
after cited as BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS](Not only will parental hostility be increased
by intrusion into the family, it will also cause reactions by the effected children such as
"anxiety, diminishing trust, loosening of emotional ties, or an increasing tendency to be
out of control.").
88. Even advocates who give great deference to the primacy of family integrity and
thus promote a policy of minimum state intervention, agree that when serious injuries are
inflicted by parents, rehabilitative efforts are not likely to be successful in regard to the
damaged parent-child relationship. As stated by these authorities, "[p]arental maltreat
ment leaves psychological scars which endure long beyond any physical healing and pre
clude a child from regaining the feeling of being safe, wanted, and cared for in the
parents' presence." BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 87, at 73. See also J.
Howell, The Role ofLaw Enforcement in the Prevention, Investigation, and Treatment of
Child Abuse in THE BATTERED CHILD, 3d ed., supra note 5, at 306-15.
The Massachusetts legislature has recently indicated a change in policy in the man
agement of child abuse and neglect cases by a recent enactment which requires the De
partment of Social Services to notify the district attorney in all cases in which a child is
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The prosecution of perpetrators of abuse and neglect, however,
is often impeded by the nature of the act itself. Crimes against chil
dren most often occur within the privacy of the home, witnessed only
by other members of the household. 89 Direct testimonial evidence,
therefore, is rarely available and the prosecution may be forced to
rely primarily on expert testimony to establish both the cause of the
inflicted injury and the party responsible for its infliction. 90 A social
worker, as an expert in family relations, may be one of the few wit
nesses available to the prosecution who has relevant, admissible evi
dence in the case. 91 Thus, a broadly defined social worker-client
privilege may render expert, relevant testimony inadmissible and
will impede investigation and prosecution of cases in which children
have been seriously injured. As a result, those with tendencies to
inflict such injuries may be allowed to continue the inappropriate
behavior without criminal sanction.
In Collett,92 although the protection for communications beseriously injured, raped, or sexually abused or exploited, in addition to those instances
which result in death. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 5lB(West Supp. 1983-84),
amended by MASS. GEN. LAWS, S. Doc. No. 2064 (Aug. 13, 1983). This bill was promul
gated in response to numerous serious child abuse cases and the subsequent death of a
number of the victims which occurred within several months at the beginning of 1983.
The Middlesex County grand jury, in what was considered a highly unusual occurrence,
issued an advisory statement which criticized the use of the social worker-client privilege
noting that the assertion of privilege was obstructing the successful intervention and
prosecution of these cases and called upon the legislature to remedy the situation. The
Boston Globe, Mar. 5, 1983, at 17, col. 5-6. The new reporting requirement abrogates the
social worker-client privilege for social workers employed by the state's Department of
Social Services and requires that all information obtained during the investigation of
specified cases be made available to the district attorney. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
119, § 51B (West Supp. 1983-84), amended by MASS. GEN. LAWS, S. Doc. No. 2064 (Aug.
13, 1983).
89. Note, Evidentiary Problems in Criminal Child Abuse Prosecutions, 63 GEO. L.J.
257 (1974); D. GIL, VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN 118-22 (1970).
90. Note, supra note 89, at 271-73.
91. Although medical expert testimony is most frequently relied upon to diagnose
the cause of a serious injury or death, see Note, supra note 89, at 272-73, in some in
stances the differential diagnosis of an injury may be uncertain, and on these occasions
the testimony of a social worker who has interviewed family members may be vital to the
disposition of the case. As an expert witness a social worker would "be permitted to
testify not just to facts within [her or his) knowledge as most witnesses must, but to opin
ions concerning those facts and to hypothetical situations as well." L. SCHROEDER, THE
LEGAL ENVIRONMENT OF SOCIAL WORK 73 (1982). See also In re Brenda H., 119 N.H.
382,386,402 A.2d 169, 172 (1979). The New Hampshire court in a custody proceeding
held that testimony of a mental health therapist and a physician was not privileged in
cases of child abuse or neglect. The court stated, "[t)he best information available to the
court concerning past and future parental behavior is often the testimony of treating
physicians, psychologists, and social and mental-health workers." Id
92. 387 Mass. 424, 439 N.E.2d 1223 (1982).
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tween the social worker and other family members fell within the
scope of the state's interest in rehabilitation, this policy cannot be
expanded to justify protection for communications between the so
cial worker and the defendant, who had no biological or psychologi
cal relationship to the child. 93 If, in the instant case, the defendant
had not admitted his guilt to the social worker, which she was re
quired to disclose under the exception to the privilege,94 the prosecu
tion may have been left with evidence that a crime had been
committed but insufficient evidence to gain an indictment. A narrow
reading of the scope of the privilege limiting the protection to the
social worker's primary clients, or intended beneficiaries of the social
services95 would avoid the likelihood of this result.

B. Scope oj'the Exception for Crimes or Harmful Acts
The exceptions to a statutory grant of privilege reflect a legisla
tive concern for competing interests that society considers of overrid
ing significance and which thus serve to abrogate the privilege in
certain instances. 96 Almost all jurisdictions abrogate the social
worker-client privilege for communications that reveal the contem
plation of a crime or harmful act,97 but only a few states also abro
gate the privilege for communications that reveal the commission of
a crime or harmful act. 98 Although the Massachusetts statute99 does
not clearly define which communications the legislature intended to
exempt from the protection of the privilege, the admissions by the
defendant in Co/lell ioo that he had hit the child on several occasions
prior to her death,lOl unquestionably fell within the scope of the ex
ception and, therefore, were subject to compelled disclosure.102 All
93. If the defendant had developed a psychological bond with the child it could
then be argued that he should be included as a member of the child's family. See gener
ally BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 87, at 40-46.
94. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 135(b) (West 1983), see supra note I for text
of the statute.
95. See infra notes 153-65 and accompanying text.
96. Collett, 387 Mass. 424, 428, 439 N.E.2d 1223, 1226. See infra notes 173-82.
97. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 71-2815(b) (Supp. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
36-26-30(2) (1977); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-35-10(2) (1974).
98. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 3913(2) (Supp. 1982); IDAHO CODE § 54
3213(2) (1979); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, § 6324(1) (Supp. 1983-84); !UN. STAT. ANN.
§ 75-5360(b) (1977); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 135(b) (West Supp. 1983); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 1272.1(3) (West Supp. 1983-84).
99. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 135(b) (West 1983), see supra note I for text
of the statute.
100. 387 Mass. 424,439 N.E.2d 1223 (1982).
101. Id. at 426. 439 N.E.2d at 1225.
102. Id. at 431-32. 439 N.E.2d at 1228.
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other communications to the social worker by the defendant and
others, however, which related to the child's injury and subsequent
death, as well as statements by the defendant suggestive of a con
sciousness of guilt, 103 were held to be outside the scope of the excep
tion and not subject to disclosure. I04
The majority in Collett reached this conclusion based substan
tially on the legislative history of the enactment. 105 The court noted
that earlier versions of the statute contained the exception now in
corporated in subsection (b) 106 and in addition provided an excep
tion which required a social worker to testify fully if the information
acquired indicated that a "child was the victim of a felony or needed
care and protection."107 The "textual differences" between the ear
lier versions of the statute and the enacted version, the court con
cluded' "seem to indicate that the legislature chose not to require a
social worker to testify fully . . . even when the crime involved a
minor." 108 In addition, the court noted, the statute had been
amended in 1981 109 and again, the legislature had failed to include
an exception for crimes or harmful acts against minors. I 10 The court
offered further support for a narrow reading of the scope of the ex
ception based on the assumed objectives of the statute. The court
stated:
103. Id at 432, 439 N.E.2d at 1228. The Commonwealth sought disclosure by the
social worker of communications with "the defendant and others concerning the child's
appearance and behavior prior to her hospitalization and the feelings, observations, sus
picions and hopes that the defendant and others interviewed held about the child and
one another," id , as well as communications with the defendant "denying any wrongdo
ing." Id at 426, 439 N.E.2d at 1225. These communications, the Commonwealth ar
gued, "reveal the commission of a crime," and a "consciousness of guilt," and therefore,
are excepted under the statute. Id at 432, 439 N.E.2d at 1228.
104. Id at 435-36, 439 N.E.2d at 1230.
105. Id at 433-34, 439 N.E.2d at 1229.
\06. Id (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 135(b)(West 1983), see supra
note I for text of statute).
\07. MASS. LEGIS. DOCUMENTS, H. 4877 (1971) and H. 1997 (1972), provided in
pertinent part, that:
No ... social worker . . . may disclose any information he may have ac
quired from persons consulting him in his professional capacity ... except:
(3) Where the person is a child under sixteen years of age and the informa
tion acquired by the ... social worker indicated that the child was the victim
of a felony or needed care and protection . . . the. . . social worker may be
required to testify fully in relation thereto. . .
\08. 387 Mass. at 433, 439 N.E.2d at 1229.
109. Id at 434, 439 N.E.2d at 1229. The 1981 amendment to the statute added
exceptions to the privilege for communications with a social worker arising pursuant to
care and protection or custody proceedings. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 135 (d)(e)
(West 1983).
1\0. 387 Mass. at 433, 439 N.E.2d at 1229.

1118

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6: 1103

The first objective [of the statute] is to encourage individuals in
need of help from a social worker to seek that help by ensuring the
confidentiality of their communications. The second objective,
embodied in subsection (b), is to serve the interests of society in
prosecuting those who are guilty of criminal conduct. In enacting
subsection (b) the Legislature attempted to balance these two
objectives. I I I

Based on the purpose of the legislation and the prior history of
the statute, the court held that a narrow reading of the exception was
warranted. Such a reading, therefore, only would require disclosure
by a social worker of "communications which relate directly to the
fact or immediate circumstances of a crime." I 12
Legislative history that does not clearly express the intent of the
legislature, however, by its nature, yields a subjective rather than an
objective result. l13 The court has broad discretion to choose what it
considers the best of several possible alternative meanings. The leg
islative history of the social worker privilege statute was reviewed by
the court in Collett to determine the intended meaning of the re
cently enacted version. There are, however, several alternative
interpretations.
The legislature's use of broad language in exception (b), which
abrogates the privilege for communications which reveal the commis
sion of a crime as well as those which reveal the contemplation of a
crime, could suggest an intent to restrict the use of the privilege in all
criminal cases. 114 Because a majority of jurisdictions abrogate the
privilege only for communications that reveal the contemplation of a
crime, 115 the additional language could be interpreted as an indica
tion of a greater interest by the legislature in prosecuting perpetra
tors of crime rather than protecting the confidences disclosed to
social workers. A New York court construing a more narrow version
of this exception 116 believed that it was unlikely that the legislature
intended the social worker privilege to protect criminal acts" 7 and,
Ill. Id. at 434-35, 439 N.E.2d at 1230.
112. Id. at 435, 439 N.E.2d at 1230.
113. See genera/Iy Dickerson, supra note 52; Note, Non/egis/ative Intent as an Aid to
Statutory Interpretation, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 676 (1949).
114. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 135(b) (West 1983), see supra note I for
text of the statute.
115. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
116. N.Y. CIv. hAC. LAW § 4508(2) (McKinney Supp. 1982-83) ("a certified social
worker shall not be required to treat as confidential a communication. . . which reveals
the contemplation of a crime. . . .").
117. People v. O'Gorman, 91 Misc. 2d 539, 541, 398 N.Y.S.2d 336, 338 (1977)(de
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therefore, rejected a narrow interpretation of the exception. I IS
A second possible interpretation of exception (b) is based on the
change of words from the earlier versions of the statute to the present
provision. The 1971 and 1972 bills abrogated the privilege for "com
munications that reveal ... a felony or harmful act," 119 whereas,
the enacted bill expanded the exception by substituting the word
crime for the word felony .120 The court in Collett 121 did not discuss
this discrepancy between the earlier and the later versions of the stat
ute. In addition, although the legislature did not include an excep
tion for situations in which a child is the victim of a crime, it is
plausible that they assumed that the extra provision would be redun
dant, since exception (b) could be read to extend to all victims of
crimes or harmful acts, including children. Thus, there is a possibil
ity that a different focus by the court in Collett would have led to a
broader reading of the exception and required the disclosure of all
communications concerning the circumstances of the child's
death. 122
The result of the supreme judicial court's interpretation of the
social worker-client privilege statute is that future perpetrators of
crimes against children who divulge information to a social worker
will be provided maximum protection for all communications. This
result may frequently be unjustifiable, particularly in cases where the
perpetrator of a crime against a child will be allowed to invoke the
privilege even though he or she is unrelated to the child, has no psy
chological or other relationship to the family, and did not seek the
advice or opinion of the social worker. Although the majority in
Collett 123 seemed to share a New York court's concern that the ex
ception abrogating the privilege was "not intended as a 'shield be
fendant's misrepresentations on a social service application not protected by statutory
privilege).
118. Id. at 542, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 338. The court in O'Gorman affirmed a principle
from an earlier case: "[T]he seal of personal confidence can never be used to cover a
transaction which is in itself a crime." Id. (quoting People v. Farmer, 194 N.Y. 251, 269,
87 N.E. 457, 464 (1909».
119. MASS. LEGIS. DOCUMENTS, H. 4877 (1971) and H. 1997 (1972) provide in
pertinent part, that a "social worker shall not be required to treat as confidential a com
munication that reveals the contemplation or commission of ale/ony or harmful act to
oneself or others." (Emphasis supplied).
120. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 135(b) (West 1983), see supra note I for
text of statute.
121. 387 Mass. 424, 439 N.E.2d 1223 (1982).
122. See supra note 103.
123. 387 Mass. 424, 439 N.E.2d 1223.
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hind which the commission of a homicide would be sheltered,' "124
ironically, the court's conclusion may allow this result. The dearth
of case law interpreting social worker privilege statutes in addition to
the lack of recorded legislative history in Massachusetts concededly
imposed a difficult task upon the court in Collett. Had the court
applied the alternative approach, as suggested by the dissent, it may
have reached a more narrow definition of the scope of the privilege
which would have limited the extension of privilege in cases of
crimes against children.
V.

SUGGESTED ANALYSIS

The most widely recognized standard for evaluating the exten
sion of a privilege to a relationship was established by Dean Wig
more. 125 According to Wigmore, four conditions must be satisfied in
order to justify the use of privilege to prevent forced disclosure of
communications originating within one of society'S valued
relationships. 126
1. The communications must originate in a confidence that
they will not be disclosed.
2. This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full
and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the
community ought to be sedulously fostered.
4. The injury that would inure to the relation by disclosure
of the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby
gained for the correct disposal of litigation. 127

Wigmore noted that few relationships, such as attorney-client,
husband-wife, and informer-government, are able to meet these cri
teria and are, therefore, valid privileges. 128 Wigmore considered
other privileges, that have been created by statute, to be the result of
professional groups' effecting new legislation to promote their own
interests and not justified because they fail to meet the requisite con
ditions. 129 Although Wigmore may not have intended his privilege
analysis to be applied to statutory as well as common law privileges,
numerous courts and commentators have utilized his requirements
124. Id at 435,439 N.E.2d at 1230 (quoting People v. Lipsky, \02 Misc. 2d 19,24,
423 N.Y.S.2d 599, 602 (1979)).
125. WIGMORE, supra note 42, § 2285, at 527.
126. Id
127. Id (Emphasis in the original).
128. Id § 2197, at 114.
129. Id § 2286, at 532; Bernstein, Privileged Communications to the Social Worker,
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to defend or attack the extension of a privilege to any given relation
ship.130 An application of Wigmore's analysis to the facts of Collett
would not support the extension of a privilege to the defendant in
this case.
A.

WIGMORE'S REQUIREMENTS

1.

The Communications Must Originate in a Co'!ftdence that
They Will Not be J)isclosed

Communications between the social worker and his or her client
"often [involve] frank confessions of marital infidelities, homosexual
relationships, business fraud or cheating, child abuse, or other confi
dential or illegal acts."131 It is theorized that without an assurance of
confidentiality, those in need of help will refrain from seeking it. 132
Although there is no evidence to substantiate this premise, it is rea
sonable to assume that individuals who reveal intimate details of
their lives to any professional do so under an implied if not actual
assurance that their communications will not be disclosed.133 The
dissent in Collett 134 noted that a basis had not been established that
would support an assumption that the social worker had implicitly
or explicitly assured "any or all of her informants," including the
defendant, that their disclosures would be held in confidence.135
1977 SOCIAL WORK 264, 267 (suggesting the need for social workers to seek legislative
recognition of a professional privilege).
The National Association of Social Workers was the principal sponsor of the social
worker-client privilege legislation which was incorporated into the social worker licens
ing Act of 1977. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, §§ 130-37 (West 1983). Brief of Amicus
Curiae National Association of Social Workers, Massachusetts Chapter at I, Common
wealth v. Collett, 387 Mass. 424, 439 N.E.2d 1223 (1982).
130. See, e.g., Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411, 417 (Alaska 1976); Perry v. Fiumano,
61 A.D.2d 512, 517, 403 N.Y.S.2d 382, 385 (1978); State v. Martin, 274 N.W.2d 893, 895
(S.D. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 883 (1979); State v. Driscoll, 53 Wis. 2d 699,706, 193
N.W.2d 851, 856 (1972); Bernstein, supra note 129, at 265; Berger, The Privileges Article in
the New York Proposed Code of Evidence, 47 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1405, 1405-06 (1981);
Note, The Social Worker- Client Relationship and Privileged Communications, 1965 WASH.
U.L.Q. 362, 366, 384-87; Comment, Underprivileged Communications: Extension of the
Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege to Patients of Psychiatric Social Workers, 61 CALIF. L.
REV. 1050, 1056-58 (1973).
131. Bernstein, supra note 129, at 264.
132. Varon v. Varon, 83 Misc. 2d 276, 283-84, 372 N.Y.S.2d 518, 524-25 (1975);
Note, supra note 130, at 385.
133. If the client is informed that confidentiality will not be maintained, however,
an implied assurance cannot exist and any existing privilege will be assumed to be
waived. State v. Martin, 274 N.W.2d 893, 896 (S.D. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 883
(1979).
134. 387 Mass. 424, 439 N.E.2d 1223 (I982)(Lynch, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 440, 439 N.E.2d at 1232-33.
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Had the social worker explicity guaranteed confidentiality in order
to elicit information from the defendant and others, then at least ar
guably, this condition would be met. This was not the case, how
ever, and therefore only an implied assurance of confidentiality
would fulfill the requirement under the facts of Collet/.
Although many jurisdictions have limited the scope of the social
worker-client privilege to apply only to a "client" relationship or to
communications originating within a therapeutic setting,136 it has
been proposed that social worker relationships, unlike those of most
other professionals, extend beyond the traditional "client" or "pa
tient" boundaries. 137 When an individual consults a psychothera
pist, for example, the revelations of "compulsions, fantasies, fears,
obsessions, and guilt,"138 would not be disclosed without an expecta
tion of confidence. 139 That an individual seeking the advice or coun
sel of a social worker would hold a similar expectation of confidence
would be a reasonable analogy. Social workers rarely treat an indi
vidual client, however, particularly in cases of child abuse and ne
glect. 140 More commonly, a social worker communicates with a
whole network of "significant people" which, in addition to family
members, may include clergy, physicians, teachers, neighbors and
friends. 141 This network forms what is referred to as a "client sys
tem."142 As stated by one author, "[i]n practice, the social worker's
efforts involve sessions with more than just one client; contact with
these other significant persons is equally dependent on the revealing
of private information."143
In Massachusetts, as in most other states, this "client system"
approach is consistent with the policy expressed in the laws pertain
ing to child abuse and neglect l44 which provide interventive, protec
tive family counseling services to rehabilitate, rather than prosecute,
abusive or neglectful parents or caretakers. 145 An implied, if not an
explicit, guarantee of confidence would be deemed essential in order
to obtain the information necessary for evaluation and treatment of
these cases and thus promote the state's interest in preservation of
136.
137.

138.
139.
140.

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
Iaccarino, supra note 84, at 370.
Comment, supra note 130, at 1057.
Id.
Iaccarino, supra note 84, at 370.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
Id.

1984)

SOCIAL WORKER-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

1123

family unity.146
The majority in Collett 147 indicated an awareness of the social
work practice within "client systems" by concluding that all of the
social worker's informants were within the scope of the privilege be
cause a "social worker's professional duties [in a case of suspected
child abuse] would necessarily involve consulting with members of
the victim's family and others closely connected to the victim's home
situation."148 The dissent in Collett, however, argued that only those
individuals who consult a social worker should have this expectation
of confidence and not those with whom the social worker consults in
the process of an investigation or evaluation. 149 Also, as the dissent
noted, it is important to distinguish between the need for confidenti
ality when a social worker is performing a counselling service, and
"the myriad other investigative and administrative tasks performed
by social workers."150 Thus, although the state's interest in main
taining the integrity of families in cases of child abuse and neglect
reasonably supports the expansion of an implied expectation of con
fidence beyond the individual "client," extension of the protection of
a privilege to all individuals who may only have a passing acquain
tance with the child or the child's caretakers, seems unjustified.
Generally, those individuals outside of the immediate family who
disclose information regarding a victimized child do so to aid the
social worker in diagnosing and treating the family.l5l Their disclo
sures primarily include personal observations of the child and the
family, and although these revelations may be a source of embar
rassment to the child's family, they pose no similar threat to the ob
server. Thus, although the "client system" concept adhered to by
social worker's would justify an extension of confidentiality beyond
the individual client, the extent that this concept can be expanded
depends upon the task being performed by the social worker as it
relates to the state's interest in encouraging individuals in need of
assistance to secure social services.
146. See, e.g., In re Brenda H., 119 N.H. 382, 386-87, 402 A.2d 169, 172-73 (1979);
State v. Fagalde, 85 Wash. 2d 730, 736-37, 539 P.2d 86, 90 (1975).
147. 387 Mass. 424, 439 N.E.2d 1223 (1982). .
148. Id at 429, 439 N.E.2d at 1227.
149. Id at 440, 439 N.E.2d at 1232 (Lynch, J., dissenting).
150. Id at 441-42, 439 N.E.2d at 1233 (Lynch, J., dissenting).
151. See BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 87, at 144-86, in which the au
thors present a narrative of the case of Maria Colwell which includes documentation of
efforts by neighbors and teachers to inform social service agencies of the child's maltreat
ment by her stepfather.

1124

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

2.

[Vol. 6: 1103

This Element of Confidentiality Must Be Essential to the
Full and Satisfactory Maintenance of the Relation
Between the Parties

Social workers contend that confidentiality for communications
between the social worker and his or her client is not only an ethical
duty imposed by professional standards, but is essential to effective
casework. 152
The sharing of. . . secrets and confidences . . . and the as
surance that they will remain confidential are necessary for the
very performance of the [social worker's] services.
Thus, the relationship between social worker and client gives
rise to the duty of confidentiality, and the duty of confidentiality
in tum gives rise to the relationship between social worker and
client. Unless the client feels free to speak freely, the social
worker's capacity to be helpful to him is severely limited. The
social worker will not find out what he may need to know to be
helpful to the client, and he will not have the client's confidence,
which may be a prerequisite to the client's acceptance of the social
worker's influence, guidance, authority, or whatever else the social
worker may have to offer to help meet the client's need. 153

The continuing need for confidentiality for communications
with social workers, therefore, similar to Wigmore's first condition,
focuses on the intended beneficiary of the social services. The need
for confidentiality in all psychotherapeutic relationships has been
recognized by courts and commentators as vital to the success of the
therapy.154 The court in Collett 155 recognized this concept as support
for the extension of the scope of the social worker-client privilege to
all communications with social workers unless they fell within the
exceptions. 156 Physicians, psychologists, and social workers, the
court noted, "all share the common purpose of encouraging the pa
tient or client to disclose the nature and details of his illness or his
emotions without fear of later revelation by one in whom he placed
152.

C. LEVY, SOCIAL WORK ETHICS 51-52 (1976); Bernstein, supra note 129, at

266.
153. LEVY, supra note 152, at 51-52.
154. See, e.g., Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411, 417 (Alaska 1976); In re Lifschutz, 2
Cal. 3d 415, 431, 467 P.2d 557, 567, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829, 839 (1970); Usen v. Usen, 359
Mass. 453, 457, 269 N.E. 2d 442,444 (1971); Iaccarino, supra note 84, at 368; Comment,
supra note 130, at 1057-58.
155. 387 Mass. 424,439 N.E.2d 1223 (1982).
156. Id at 428, 439 N.E.2d at 1226.
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his trust and confidence." 157 The court, however, refused to limit the
scope of the privilege to therapeutic relationships absent a clear
mandate from the legislature to do SO.15S
At least one court, however, has indicated an unwillingness to
recognize such a broad need for confidentiality for communications
with social workers. A New York court, in In re Clear, 159 a proceed
ing to terminate a mother's custody, held, inter alia, that the commu
nications between the mother and the social worker in the course of
multiple counselling sessions to "encourage and strengthen the pa
rental relationship" were not privileged. '60 The court, using Wig
more's analysis, stated that "there [was] no evidence as to the
essentiality of confidentiality between the social worker and the
mother, and no evidence [had] been submitted as to the character or
the extent of the relationship between the social worker and the
mother." 161 The court did not define the elements necessary to jus
tify a need for confidentiality, but did note that in custody cases the
welfare of the child was the primary interest of the state and to allow
the protection of confidentiality for communications between the
child's mother and the social worker would be contrary to that
interest. 162
In cases of child abuse or neglect, as has been noted, the state's
interest is to maintain the integrity of the family.'63 This interest,
therefore, would justify the need for confidentiality between the par
ents or caretakers and the social worker, even though the child
would be considered the primary beneficiary of the social services. 164
But absent any prospective relationship among the child, the social
worker and an informant, there is no justification for the extension
of the protection of confidentiality. 165 In Collett, although the child's
mother, a non-party to the action, would be within the parameters of
157. Id (quoting Perry v. Fiumano, 61 A.D.2d 512, 516, 403 N.Y.S.2d 382, 384
(1978».
158. Id at 429-30, 439 N.E.2d at 1227.
159. 58 Misc. 2d 699, 296 N.Y.S.2d 184 (1969), rev'd on other grounds, sub nom. In
re Klug, 32 A.D.2d 915, 302 N.Y.S.2d 418 (1969), on remand 65 Misc. 2d 323, 318
N.Y.S.2d 876 (1970).
160. 58 Misc. 2d at 700, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 186.
161. Id at 702, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 187.
162. Id at 702-03, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 187-88.
163. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
164. People v. Easter, 90 Misc. 2d 748,753,395 N.Y.S.2d 926,930 (1977); D. BRIE
LAND & J. LEMMON, SOCIAL WORK AND THE LAW 288 (1977).
165. The social worker-client relationship, similar to other therapeutic relation
ships, is built slowly on a foundation of trust. Iaccarino, supra note 84, at 367-68; Loui
sell & Sinclair, The Supreme Court of California 1969-70, Foreward' Rejiections on the
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the state's interest in extending confidentiality, no evidence was
presented that would support the expansion of this protection to the
defendant and others.

3.

The Relation Must Be One Which in the Opinion of the
Community Ought to Be Sedulously Fostered

Social workers provide innumerable, valuable services to indi
viduals, families, and groups which must be encouraged and sup
ported not only because of the benefit derived by the direct
recipients of the services but also because of the benefit conferred on
the community as a whole. Social workers, as experts in family rela
tions,166 are called upon to counsel a myriad of circumstances: mar
ried couples in conflict; divorced parents in custody disputes;
adolescents unable to adjust educationally, vocationally or socially;
the unemployed; the unemployable; unmarried mothers; single par
ents; childless couples; the abused and the abuser; the ill; the dying;
and the bereaved. 167 The community benefits from social services
that enable its citizens to improve the quality of their lives and be
come useful members of the community.168 It is the expectation that
a benefit will be derived by a social worker-client relationship, how
ever, that merits the community's attention. If a relationship is not
likely to result in a benefit to the recipient, then it does not meet
Wigmore's condition as one which should be sedulously fostered by
the community.169
In Collett,11° although it would be assumed that any relation
ship between an alleged abuser and a social worker would merit the
encouragement of the community, the relationships among the social
worker, the defendant and others fail to meet Wigmore's third condi
tion. The social worker in Collett was employed by a private hospi
tal to treat families of abused children admitted to that facility.l7l
The defendant and some of the other nonparties to the action were
not members of the victim's immediate family or household, but
were sources of information for the social worker. Although the
community would have an interest in promoting cooperation with
Law of Privileged Communications - The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege in Perspective,
59 CALIF. L. REV. 30, 52 (1971).
166. Bernstein, supra note 129, at 264.
167. Id; Note, supra note 130, at 385-86.
168. Note, supra note 130, at 386.
169. Id
170. 387 Mass. 424, 439 N.E.2d 1223 (1982).
171. Id at 426, 439 N.E.2d at 1225.
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social worker investigations, these individuals were not intended re
cipients of the social services and, therefore, no relationship existed
that would warrant the encouragement and support mandated by
Wigmore's third requirement
4.

The Injury that Would Inure to the Relation by Disclosure of the
Communications Must be Greater than the Benefit Thereby
Gainedlor the Correct Disposal of Litigation

Disclosures of client confidences by a social worker will obvi
ously destroy the relationship and may serve to discourage those in
need of help from seeking assistance. Regardless of the critical need
for preservation of confidentiality in society's valued relationships,
however, this interest must yield to serve the interests of justice in
appropriate circumstances. The court in Collett recognized the need
to effect a balance between conflicting state interests, but believed
that this was a legislative function.172 State interests which were of
overriding significance as compared to the need to protect confi
dences, the court noted, had been promulgated by the legislature as
exceptions to the statutory privilege. 173 Most states deny the social
worker-client privilege if the communications reveal the contempla
tion of a crime,174 if charges are brought against the social worker by
the client,175 or if the privilege is waived by the client or the client's
representative. 176 Fifteen states also limit the privilege and require
the social worker to testify fully if the communications indicate that
a minor was the victim of a crime. 177 Although the supreme judicial
172. Id at 428, 439 N.E.2d at 1226.
173. Id
174. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. The right of the public to be
warned of any threats to their safety or well-being has been held to be of overriding
significance as compared to a need for confidentiality in a relationship. Tarasoff v. Re
gents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425,551 P.2d 334,131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
175. The exception allowing the social worker to defend against civil or criminal
malpractice allegations is recognized in all jurisdictions. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch.
III, § 6324(2) (Supp. 1983-84); N.Y. ClV. PRAC. § 4508(4) (McKinney Supp. 1982-83).
176. The privilege belongs to the client and although under the statute it must be
asserted by the social worker, it is done on behalf of the client. MCCORMICK, supra note
6, at 152. As the owner of the privilege, the client has the power to waive the right.
WIGMORE, supra note 42, § 2327.
177. Illinois is the only state to abrogate the privilege by case law for cases involv
ing a minor. People v. McKean, 94 Ill. App. 3d 502, 418 N.E.2d 1130 (1981). All other
states have abrogated the privilege by statute. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 71-2815(c) (Supp.
1983); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1027 (West Supp. 1983); COLO. REv. STAT. § 12-63.5-115(c)
(1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 3913(3) (Supp. 1982); IDAHO CODE § 54-3213(3)
(1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-5360(c) (1977); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 335.170(3) (Bobbs
Merrill 1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:2714B(2) (West 1974); N.Y. ClV. PRAC. LAW
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court believed that it was constrained by the language of the statute,
other courts have recognized a need to balance conflicting state in
terests on a case by case basis.
The New York court, in In re Clear, 178 denied the protection of
privilege for communications between a social worker and a mother
in a proceeding to terminate parental custody. Although the mother
had been counselled by the social worker for several years in an ef
fort to improve the parental relationship, the court held, inter alia,
that "disclosure of evidence relevant to a correct determination of
whether the mother of an infant should be permanently deprived of
its custody must be regarded as of far greater importance than any
injury that might inure to the relationship between the social worker
and the mother."179 In a more recent New York decision, the court
similarly found that the state had an overriding interest in paternity
determinations and refused to allow the protection of privilege for
communications between the reputed father and a social worker. 180
In a similar manner, an Illinois court,181 in the absence of an
explicit exception to the social worker-client privilege, abrogated the
protection for confidential communications in cases of child abuse in
light of the legislative mandate that required social workers in the
Department of Children and Family Services to investigate cases of
child abuse to prevent further abuses to the child. 182
Although the state undoubtedly has an interest in encouraging
perpetrators of child abuse to seek assistance, the policies of the state
which favor rehabilitation over prosecution of abusive family mem
bers l83 cannot be stretched to include those who are strangers to the
§ 4508(3) (McKinney 1982-83); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 1272.1(3) (West Supp. 1983
84); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.250(4) (1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 36-26-30(3) (1977);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-35-10(3) (1974); VA. CODE § 8.01-400.2 (Supp. 1983). Similar to
the Massachusetts statute, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 135(e) (West 1983), a few
jurisdictions also abrogate the privilege in custody proceedings. See, e.g., COLO. REV.
STAT. § 12-63.5-115(3) (1978); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-5360(c) (1977); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 37:2714(C) (West 1974); see also In re Clear, 58 Misc. 2d 699, 296 N.Y.S.2d 184
(1969), rev'd on other grounds, sub nom. In re Klug, 32 A.D.2d 915, 302 N.Y.S.2d 418
(1969), on remand 65 Misc. 2d 323, 318 N.Y.S.2d 876 (1970).
178. 58 Misc. 2d 699, 296 N.Y.S.2d 184 (1969), rev'd on other grounds, sub nom. In
re Klug, 32 A.D.2d 915, 302 N.Y.S.2d 418 (1%9), on remand 65 Misc. 2d 323, 318
N.Y.S.2d 876 (1970).
179. 58 Misc. 2d at 703, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 188. See supra note 170 for jurisdictions
abrogating the privilege by statute for custody proceedings.
180. In re Humphrey v. Norden, 79 Misc. 2d 192, 359 N.Y.S.2d 733 (1974).
181. People v. McKean, 94 Ill. App. 3d 502, 418 N.E.2d 1130 (1981); In re Pitts, 44
Ill. App. 3d 46, 357 N.E.2d 872 (1976).
182. In re Pitts, 44 Ill. App. 3d at 48-49, 357 N.E.2d at 874.
183. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
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family as the basis for the protection of privilege. The need to prose
cute the murder of a child to deter the future injury or death of other
children must be considered a superior interest of the state which
overrides any injury that may occur to the social worker-client
relationship.
In summary, only the first of Wigmore's four conditions is met
by the defendant and other non-parties to the action in Collett.
Therefore, no privilege is justified and full disclosure by the social
worker should have been required.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The recently enacted social worker-client privilege statute, in
the absence of clear documentation of legislative intent, presented
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court with an opportunity to
exercise broad discretion in interpreting the statute in Commonwealth
v. Collett. Although many courts and commentators have relied
uron Wigmore's analysis to evaluate the extension of a privilege to
certain relationships, the Massachusetts court did not consider this
approach. The court was also reluctant to consider similar adjudica
tions in other jurisdictions. Either alternative would favor a more
narrow interpretation than was rendered by the supreme judicial
court. The court's decision which broadly defined the scope of the
social worker-client privilege, instead, offers maximum protection
for communications between social workers and perpetrators or po
tential witnesses of crimes against children.
Under Wigmore's privilege analysis no privilege would be justi
fied between the social worker and the defendant or others who were
non-parties and unrelated to the victim in Collett. In the alternative,
a recognition by the supreme judicial court of the rule in a majority
of other jurisdictions, would support abrogating the privilege in all
cases in which a minor was the victim of a crime.
Although the court's opinion has been somewhat limited by re
cent legislation which denies the use of privilege in cases in which a
child has been seriously injured, raped, sexually assaulted or has
died, the new law applies only to social workers employed by the
state and, therefore, would have no effect on a future case with facts
similar to Collett.
Susan Starobin

